War of Attrition: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment on Market Exit by RYan Oprea et al.
War of Attrition: Evidence from a Laboratory
Experiment on Market Exit
Ryan Opreay Bart J. Wilsonz Arthur Zillantex
July 5, 2010
Abstract
We report an experiment designed to study whether inecient rms are systematically
driven from overcrowded markets. Our data set includes series of 3800 wars of attrition
of a type modeled in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). We nd that exit tends to be ecient
and exit times conform surprisingly well to point predictions of the model. Moreover,
subjects respond similarly to implementations framed in terms of losses as they do to
those framed in terms of gains.
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11 Introduction
Young industries often undergo a process of shakeout (see for example Gort and Klepper
(1982) and Klepper (1996)), attracting excess rms and gradually shedding them over time.
More mature industries are likewise often forced to contract in the face of recession or product
specic negative demand shocks. When an overcrowded industry is forced to shrink, which
rms exit and which ones survives? One popular answer in economics is that overcrowded
industries tend to shed inecient rms and retain ecient ones. We might call this \survival
of the most ecient", a process analogous to natural selection that can adaptively improve
the eciency of industries over time (see e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) model rms' exit decisions in overcrowded duopoly markets
as wars of attrition and show that the intuition of survival of the most ecient has merit
even if rms have little information regarding their costs relative to their competitors. How-
ever, the equilibrium of their game is complex, involving a solution to a system of dierential
equations. Since neither Fortune 500 CEOs in the naturally occurring markets nor under-
graduate participants in laboratory markets deliberately solve dierential equations when
deciding to exit a declining market, it is an open question as to how well Fudenberg and
Tirole's rational reconstruction of the exit decision corresponds to the facts of how people
make such decisions.
We report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer this question. Nearly
200 subjects in 16 sessions participated in a total of 3800 laboratory wars of attrition based
on Fudenberg and Tirole's model. At the beginning of each period, subjects were randomly
paired and given a private cost draw that (usually) induced negative net per second payos
in a shared market and positive net payos per second in monopoly. Subjects then decided
in real time whether and when to exit the market, never to return. Monotonic equilibrium
strategy functions predict higher cost (inecient) subjects exit at an earlier time than their
lower cost competitors; relatively ecient subjects survive in the market.
We nd that Fudenberg and Tirole's model organizes our data surprisingly well, especially
considering its complexity. We observe exit by the higher cost rm in 76 percent of cases.
When dierences between the costs faced by rms are substantial, the rate of ecient exit
rises to nearly 100 percent. Point predictions on exit times are likewise quite close to the
2data, particularly in the crucial higher portion of the cost distribution that generally governs
exit times. The median deviation from equilibrium exit times is zero and on average subjects
earn payouts identical to those predicted in equilibrium.
Our design permits tests of two other conjectures in Fudenberg and Tirole. First our
data supports Fudenberg and Tirole's core comparative static prediction that a decrease in
the ex ante likelihood of actually being in a war of attrition leads to an increase in the speed
of exit.
Second, we ran half of our sessions with costs framed as Fixed Costs (suered while
in the market) and half with costs framed as Opportunity Costs (earned by exiting the
market). There is no evidence that this treatment variable aects exit behavior. This
isomorphism between gains and losses, predicted by standard theory, stands in stark contrast
to evidence from previous individual decision making experiments suggesting asymmetries
in how subjects react to potential losses and potential gains.
Although wars of attrition have an important place in the game theoretic literature, there
are surprisingly few experimental studies relating to them. Kirchkamp (2004) studies an all
pay auction1 in a near-continuous time setting like ours. He reports evidence of underbid-
ding and marginal evidence that increased uncertainty regarding costs induces greater bids
(in contrast to predictions). Bilodeau et al. (2004) study a three player full information
war of attrition (framed as a volunteer game) and report widespread failure of equilibrium
predictions (the predicted volunteer in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) only
volunteers 41% of the time). Finally Phillips and Mason (1997) consider a quantity choice
game and vary whether xed costs lead to wars of attrition at Cournot equilibrium outputs.
They report evidence that subjects voluntarily enter wars of attrition in this setting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe a sim-
plied version of the Fudenberg-Tirole model. Section 3 presents our experimental design,
procedures, and predictions. In section 4 we present the experimental results and conclude
in section 5.
1Bulow and Klemperer (1999) show that all pay auctions are isomorphic to wars of attrition.
32 Model
Consider the following stripped down version of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).2 Firms i = 1;2
compete in a market in continuous time, earning duopoly revenues RD while they do. If one
rm exits the market, the remaining rm earns monopoly revenues RM > RD forever. Firm
i incurs a xed cost ci drawn independently and privately from a common (and common
knowledge) uniform distribution U[c;c] as long as it is in the market. Without loss of








if both are in the market
if only i is in the market
if i is not in the market
(1)
Time is discounted at a rate r 2 (0;1). The agent's strategy is a time ti at which to exit the
market if her counterpart has not yet left.
When c1 > RD, agents are in a war of attrition; both suer losses as long as they share
the market yet each would prefer the other leave rst. If war of attrition is guaranteed ex
ante (if c > RD ) such a game notoriously has a continuum of perfect Bayes equilibria (see
for example Riley (1980) and Nalebu and Riley (1985)). However, by introducing a small
probability that c1 < RD (accomplished by setting c < RD ), the set of symmetric equilibria
shrinks to one. The unique equilibrium strategy function takes the form of a monotonically
decreasing time Ti(ci) at which agent i leaves the market if (and only if) her counterpart has
not yet exited. This monotonicity gurantees survival of the most ecient; the highest cost
rm is the one driven from the market.
The intuition for this result is relatively straightforward. A rm plans to exit at the
moment when the cost of staying in the market for another moment just equals the expected
benet. The instantaneous cost of remaining in the market is RD   Ci(t) (where Ci(t) 
T
 1
i (t)) while the benet is that the competitor may leave yielding discounted returns of
RM Ci(t)
r . The probability a competitor actually leaves in the coming instant, conditional on
not having left already, is given by the probability that the rm faces a cost that would not
2Fudenberg and Tirole provide analogous results for rms facing a more general class of cost distributions
and time varying revenues.
4induce it to exit now but would induce it to exit in an instant. This in turn is given by the
product of the hazard rate at the cost that would induce present exit, 1
Ci(t) c, and the slope
of the exit cost function, C
0
 i(t). Setting cost equal to expected benets, imposing symmetry
and rearranging, we arrive at the following dierential equation:
C
0
i (t) = r[Ci (t)   c]

Ci (t)   RD
Ci (t)   RM

: (2)
Finally, a rm with a cost as high as the monopoly revenue should immediately exit the
market. Firm i's strategy function, Ti(c) is therefore the inverse of the solution to (2),
subject to the boundary condition Ci(0) = RM.3 This function is strictly monotonic on
[RD;RM], innite below this range and zero above.
A core comparative static prediction of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) is that increasing
the mass of the distribution towards c leads to (weakly) earlier exit times for each cost type.
This is because doing so increases the probability that one's competitor will never leave.
The uniform distribution has constant mass, ruling out an exact test of this prediction. An
analogous prediction, available under a uniform distribution, is that a distribution with a
lower value of c will induce earlier exit for each cost draw. Numerical results, provided in
Section 3.1, indicate that this is indeed true for our parameters and we use this fact to test
the spirit of this prediction from Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).
We have so far framed costs as xed losses suered by remaining in the market. As
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) note, the model can alternatively be described in terms of









if both are in the market
if only i is in the market
if i is not in the market
(3)
yields identical equilibrium strategy functions.
3Another available boundary condition is that rms with costs equal to duopoly prots should never exit
meaning limt!1 Ci(t) = RD.
53 Design, Procedures and Predictions
We ran a total of 16 sessions each with 12 subjects (except for one session with 10 subjects)
and 20 periods of play. In each period we randomly matched subjects into pairs to play
discrete, real time implementations of Fudenberg and Tirole's model.
Subjects begin each period in duopoly and each can unilaterally exit at any time prior
to the period's random expiration time. In all sessions, subjects earn revenues RD = 100
for each second they spend sharing the market and RM = 100 for each second spent in the
market alone. Because innite periods are impractical, we induce impatience by instituting
a 1 percent per-second hazard that the current second would be the period's last (equivalent
to setting a discount rate r = 0:01).
At the beginning of each period subjects are assigned an independent cost drawn from a
symmetric, common knowledge distribution. In 8 sessions costs are drawn from the Narrow
cost distribution (ci 2 [95;405]) and in 8 further sessions they are drawn from the Wide cost
distribution (ci 2 [40;460]).4 This between session variation constitutes our main treatment
variable, allowing us to test Prediction 3, below.
As Fudenberg and Tirole note, the model's predictions do not depend on whether rms
face opportunity costs from being in the market suer realized xed cost from being in it.
To enable tests of this prediction (Prediction 4, below), half of our sessions use a Fixed Cost
implementation and half use an Opportunity cost implementation. In 8 Opportunity cost
sessions (4 under each cost distribution) subjects earn RD when sharing the market, RM
when in the market alone and ci when out of the market. In 8 Fixed Cost sessions (again
4 under each cost distribution), subjects are assigned 25,000 in initial capital. 5 They then
4These cost distributions (a) satisfy the necessary condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in FT given our
parameters of RM = 400 and RD = 100 and furthermore (b) allow some separation between the predicted
equilibrium exit times for subjects who draw the same cost under dierent cost treatments. The mean of
each is the mean of the duopoly and monopoly revenues meaning equilibrium subjects were equally likely to
exit instantly and to never exit at all.
5The starting capital is calibrated to cover equilibrium duopoly losses given randomly determined period
lengths. This calibration worked well; in only 3 cases did a subject exhaust this capital and only prior to
period 10. In these cases subjects were forced out of the market as it is infeasible to allow subjects to earn
negative cash amounts.
6earn RD ci for each second they spend as duopolists, RM ci for each second as monopolists
and 0 for each second spent outside the market. We pose the predicted isomorphism between
these sessions as Prediction 4 below.
Half of our sessions were conducted at George Mason University in October 2005 and half
at Chapman University in April 2009 and these locations were balanced across the treatment
design. Twelve subjects participated in each session but one (which contained 10 subjects).
Subjects were paid based on one randomly selected period and received $1 for each 3000
points earned. Subject payments, including a $5 payment for showing up ($7 in Chapman
sessions), ranged from $7.75 to $33.75, and averaged approximately $15 for sessions lasting
up to 75 minutes.
3.1 The Model's Predictions and Alternatives
The model makes four main testable predictions under our experimental design. We outline
and motivate them below and conclude the section with a discussion of their plausibility and
reasonable alternative predictions.
Most of the predictions of the model can be visualized in Figure 1 which plots numerical
strategy functions derived from (2). A rst and main prediction follows directly from the
monotonicity of these strategy functions; a higher cost rm must exit before the lower cost
rm, generating an ecient pattern of exit and \survival of the most ecient".
Prediction 1. Higher cost rms tend to exit the market and lower cost rms tend to remain.
A far more stringent prediction is that subjects employ strategy functions quantitatively
similar to equilibrium ones. Testing the point predictions is complicated by two forms of
censoring in our data, unavoidable in our design. First, period lengths are random and
sometimes end prior to either subject making an exit decision. Second, we can only observe
one exit decision per pair.
The theory provides guidance on how to form testable predictions in the face of these
complications. First, the model provides predictions only for periods that last long enough to
permit equilibrium behavior. Therefore our predictions are necessarily specialized to periods
that last long enough to admit equilibrium exit times. Second, the theory makes predictions
7Figure 1: Equilibrium strategy functions.
8about the exit times experienced by pairs of subjects. Specically, the timing of exit events
should follow the equilibrium strategy function of the higher cost rm.6 Together these
generate a quantitative prediction, testable using our data.
Prediction 2. In periods long enough to admit equilibrium behavior, the observed exit time
will be close to the higher cost rm's equilibrium strategy, plotted in Figure 1.
The strategy functions plotted in Figure 1 are distinct because the two cost distributions
have dierent mass below the duopoly revenue level. The dierences between these strategy
functions predict a treatment eect across sessions under our design:
Prediction 3. Wars of attrition resolve more quickly in Wide distribution sessions than in
Narrow distribution sessions.
Finally, Fudenberg and Tirole point out and standard economic theory predicts that
the direct losses incurred in Fixed Cost sessions and the earnings foregone out-of-market in
Opportunity Cost sessions will induce similar behavior.
Prediction 4. Exit behavior is similar in Opportunity Cost and Fixed Cost sessions.
The model's predictions are computationally demanding, requiring agents to solve a sys-
tem of dierential equations and to properly impute similar reasoning to their opponents.
The literature is littered with examples of models (e.g. the theory of competitive equilib-
rium) that organize complex human decision making quite well though not because human
subjects are adroit theorists. Clearly neither subjects nor business executives employ in-
volved mathematics when making timing decisions, and this is not the question posed by
our experiment (we're pretty condent our subjects were not solving dierential equations in
their heads during our sessions). Rather our aim is to learn whether Fudenberg and Tirole's
model is a good description of heuristic human decision making.
Of course the literature is also littered with examples of models failing to predict human
behavior (e.g. centipede games). Interestingly, such a failure need not spell disaster for the
model's central prediction that ecient rms survive in markets (Prediction 1). Even if the
point predictions (Prediction 2) of the model fail spectacularly, ecient exit will prevail as
6Jointly, these two restrictions mean that we will have access to data on the strategy function for, roughly,
the upper 2/3 of the cost function. As it turns out this is the most important part of the strategy function
as it is the part most likely to govern the timing of the exit event.
9long as strategy functions are monotonically decreasing. Other plausible heuristics will lead
to inecient exit and a rejection of Prediction 1. For instance subjects may choose to exit
without much regard to variations in costs, hoping only to outlast their opponents. The
resulting 
at strategy functions will fail to systematically weed out inecient subjects.
Prediction 4 rests on a fundamental isomorphism in economic theory between explicit
losses and foregone opportunities. There is some experimental evidence showing that subjects
sometimes treat the two types of payo possibilities quite dierently and these observations
have been formalized as the theory of loss aversion (e.g. Kahneman and Tverksy 1979, 1991).
Loss aversion would seem to predict earlier exit times under Fixed Cost sessions (where losses
are explicitly suered while in the market) than under Opportunity Cost sessions (where
gains are simply smaller than those available outside of the market). We consider this a
reasonable alternative hypothesis to Prediction 4 and the experiment was designed to enable
a sharp test.
4 Results
As we point out in the previous section, the model only makes predictions for periods that last
long enough to admit equilibrium behavior. We therefore restrict attention to period/pair
combinations for which equilibrium strategies are, in principle, observable.7 Further, to focus
on the decisions of relatively experienced subjects we focus our analysis on data from the
nal half (nal 10 periods) of each session.
The model's rst prediction is that the higher cost rm in any pair tends to exit the
market and the lower cost rm tends to remain. In our data higher cost rms exit the
market 76 percent of the time while lower cost rms exit in only 18 percent of pairs. The
remaining 6 percent of cases are censored by expiration.
In order to formally test the prediction, we examine, for each session, the dierence in
rates of exit by higher and lower cost rms. Using the dierence in session level rates (high
7Expiration times are exogenous, unknowable to subjects and uncorrelated with observables such as cost.
This method of sampling therefore does not introduce any new source of bias and has been used in previous
work (see e.g. Oprea et al. (2009)).
10Figure 2: Propensity of ecient and inecient rms to exit as a function of the dierence between
their costs.
11cost rate of exit minus low cost rate of exit) as our unit of observation, we conduct Wilcoxon
signed rank tests for Narrow and Wide cost distributions (giving us 8 data points for each
test). This statistic is signicantly greater than zero under both Narrow (p=0.01415) and
Wide (p=0.008) cost ranges.8
Very inecient rms are far more likely to exit rst than only slightly inecient rms.
Figure 2 plots rates of exit for higher cost and lower cost rms as a function of the cost
dierence between the two rms in a pair. Under both Narrow and Wide cost ranges, we
observe a strong increasing (decreasing) relationship between the dierence in costs and the
rate of exit by higher (lower) cost rms. Thus, inecient rms are more likely to exit the
more inecient they are relative to their competitors. Ecient exit is substantially more
likely the more it enhances eciency.9
Result 1. The higher cost rm in a pair tends to exit and the lower cost rm tends to
remain. Greater cost dierences induce higher rates of ecient exit.
The model's second prediction is that subjects exit at times consistent with the equilib-
rium strategy function. As we pointed out above, our data here is doubly censored. First, in
roughly six percent of cases the period ends before an exit decision is made. Second, we only
observe one exit time per pair. Were we to look only at observed exit times as a function of
cost, we would necessarily face a severely downward biased sample.
We can reduce or eliminate this bias by focusing on the behavior of the pair's higher
cost subject,10 whose decisions in both theory and fact are generally uncensored. When we
do not observe the higher cost rm's exit decision due to censoring either by the lower cost
rm or expiration, we are provided a lower bound on the higher cost rm's exit time. The
combination of observed exit behavior and censoring times gives us a lower bound estimate
on the higher cost rm's strategy function. Since expiration censoring is rare and lower cost
8We pool Fixed and Opportunity Cost sessions to fully take advantage of our factorial design and to
permit higher power tests. As we show below (and as predicted) there are no signicant dierences between
Fixed and Opportunity Cost sessions.
9This is precisely the pattern expected with any noisy implementation of the strategy function.
10Note that subjects do not know whether they are the higher cost subject in any given period and in
general a subject will be the high cost and the low cost subject multiple times in the experiment. Thus
estimates of the higher cost subject's strategy function also functions as an estimate of the latent strategy
utilized by lower cost subjects.





















































Figure 3: Timing of exit. Points are medians from 10 point bins binned and scaled based on the
number of observations. Plots also show regions resulting in a 5% or smaller (dark gray) and 10 %
or smaller expected loss relative to best response.
13exit tends to occur when costs are similar, this lower bound is likely to be close to the true
strategy function.
Exit times are centered precisely on predictions; under each cost distribution, the median
deviation of observed exit times from equilibrium predictions is 0. In order to provide
a conservative test of deviations from predicted exit times, we examine the 16 by-session
median deviations of resolution times from predicted times. The median of by-session median
deviations is only one half of a second, a number indistinguishable from zero at the ve
percent level (Wilcoxon test, p = 0:071).
Figure 3 plots median exit time estimates for each pair as a function of the pair's high cost.
Costs are binned in 10 point intervals and points are scaled to the number of observations
in the bin to give a visual sense of empirical weight. Data from Fixed Cost sessions are
plotted in green and those from Opportunity Cost sessions in red. In both Narrow and
Wide distributions, points track the equilibrium quite closely, especially at higher costs and
especially where there is the most data (larger points).
Figure 3 also displays gray bands representing the equilibrium payo function away from
the best response. Dark gray areas represent points expected to lead to a less than 5 percent
loss relative to equilibrium play and light gray areas a less than 10 percent loss. Most of
the medians lie in the 5 percent bounds and virtually all lie in the 10 percent bounds. Thus
even estimates that deviate from the strategy function in Figure 3 are generally very nearly
equilibrium best responses.
Result 2. Exit timing tracks the equilibrium strategy function quite closely in all treatments.
The median deviation from equilibrium times is zero.
On average subjects play near-best responses to equilibrium strategies. How much do
subjects on average actually forego by playing observed strategies rather than precise equi-
librium strategies? To nd out we look, for each subject, at the dierence between observed
earnings and counterfactual earnings from joint equilibrium play. We plot CDFs for each
treatment in Figure 4. The median foregone earnings from deviations from equilibrium are
zero and in each case are roughly symmetrically distributed. A Wilcoxon test using by-
session medians as units of observation cannot distinguish the dierence from zero at the
ve percent level (p = 0:077).
14Figure 4: CDFs of the dierence between observed payos and equilibrium payos.
15Result 3. Observed earnings are insignicantly dierent from equilibrium earnings.
We now turn to treatment level tests of the model's comparative static predictions. The
model's rst comparative static prediction (Prediction 3) is that Narrow cost distributions
induce later exit than Wide cost distributions. In order to test this prediction we compare
by-session median exit times across cost distributions. Mann-Whitney tests allow us to reject
the hypothesis that the two are equal at the one percent percent level (p < 0:001).
Result 4. As predicted, wars of attrition are lengthier when the support of the cost distri-
bution is less diuse.
The nal prediction of the theory (Prediction 4) is that behavior in Opportunity Cost
sessions is no dierent from behavior in Fixed Cost sessions. Figure 3 provides some evidence.
Purple points are generally quite close to green dots in both cases indicating little dierence
between cost types. Under the Wide distribution, Fixed Cost exit times actually appear
to be a bit later than Opportunity Cost times, the opposite of the eect suggested by loss
aversion.
We conduct two statistical tests of Prediction 4. First we consider whether the eciency
of exit is impacted by the type of cost experienced. We examine the dierence in rates of
exit by higher cost and lower cost rms for each session. Comparing session medians of these
dierences across Fixed and Opportunity Cost implementations with a Wilcoxon test, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the net rate of ecient exit is identical (p = 0:172). Next
we consider whether the timing of exit events is aected by the type of cost. We compare
by-session median exit times across Opportunity and Fixed Cost implementations using a
Mann-Whitney test and fail to reject the hypothesis that subjects exit at the same times
(p = 0:429). Thus:
Result 5. Exit behavior is not signicantly aected by the type of cost.
5 Discussion
We examined 3800 laboratory exit timing games conducted with nearly 200 subjects over
16 experimental sessions. In most duopoly pairs, the subject assigned the higher cost exited
16prior to their lower cost competitor. Our results therefore support Fudenberg and Tirole's
(1986) prediction that ecient rms tend to survive in markets.
Finer points of Fudenberg and Tirole's computationally intensive model are surprisingly
well supported by the data. The median deviation of exit times from equilibrium predic-
tions is zero and over a large cost range exit times match the strategy function quite well.
Moreover, earnings of the median pair are equal to their counterfactual equilibrium earnings.
The data also support two ancillary predictions. First, as the Fudenberg-Tirole model
predicts rms engage in shorter wars of attrition when there is a greater probability that
one's rival has no incentive to exit. Second, rms react to the potential for gain outside of
the market in a way that is nearly symmetric to the way they react to losses suered while
in the market. That is, subjects' behavior is not aected signicantly by changing xed
costs suered in the market into opportunity costs captured by leaving the market. This
result stands in contrast to asymmetric behavior to gains and losses observed in a number of
individual decision making environments. Along with Rappaport, Seale, Erev, and Sundali
(1998), our results suggest that these types of asymmetries may be less prevalent or have a
lesser impact in strategic settings.
Besides providing direct facts on an important market mechanism, our experiment high-
lights the powerful predictive potential of economic theory. Economics experiments often
emphasize deviations from models, usefully illuminating the failure of economic theory to
account for important features of individual decision making. No less illuminating is the
large body of evidence to which we contribute showing that even mathematically involved
models often beautifully anticipate the outcomes of human interactions.
Our experiment is conducted in real time, allowing subjects to experience a relatively
realistic simulation of the problem being studied. While we believe this is the appropriate
way to study models with time dimensions, it does not come without costs. Censoring,
unavoidable in a real-time implementation, allows us a credible estimate of only the upper
2/3 of the strategy function. Future research might revisit our research using the strategy
method, perhaps yielding additional insight on the empirical strategy function.
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19Figure 5: Opportunity Cost treatment screenshots.
Appendix: Instructions for the Experiment
Instructions for the OCH Sessions
Thank you for participating in today's experiment in economic decision-making. If you
have any questions please do not hesitate to ask myself or one of the other experimenters.
At this time I ask that you refrain from talking to any of the other participants.
This experiment will last for 20 rounds. In this experiment, you will earn ECUs. At the
end of the experiment, you will earn $1 for each 3000 in ECUs you earn. Your total round
20Figure 6: Fixed Cost treatment screenshots.
21prots are listed on the top of your screen. At the end of the experiment, one participant will
pick a number out of a hat and you will be paid your earnings for the round that corresponds
to the chosen number. These earnings are in addition to your $5 show-up fee.
In this experiment, you will be either a Red or Blue participant for the entire experiment.
If you are a Red participant it will read, "You are red" under the red gure on your screen,
and if you are a Blue participant it will read, "You are blue" under the blue gure. You will
be randomly matched with another participant in the room for each of the 20 rounds of the
experiment. The current round that the experiment is in is displayed on the bottom of the
screen.
Each round will last for a number of seconds. At each second, there is a 1 percent chance
that the round will randomly end.
At the beginning of each round, both you and your counterpart are in the Market. The
Market is the yellow area on your screen. As each second passes you will remain in the
Market unless you choose to exit. You can choose to exit the Market by pressing the exit
button next to your gure. When you exit, your gure will literally walk out of the Market.
If you choose to exit the Market you will remain out of the Market for the remainder of
the round.
How do I earn money?
You will earn money each second during a round. Your earnings per second will be based
on whether you are in the Market and whether your counterpart is in the Market.
When both you and your counterpart are in the Market, you each earn 100 ECUs per
second. However, if one of you chooses to exit the Market, then the one who is left alone in
the Market will earn 400 ECUs per second.
Do I earn money if I exit the Market?
Yes, you earn money if you exit the Market. On the right-hand side of the screen is a chart
labeled Outside Prots Per Second. The red bar on the chart shows the range of possible
amounts Red could earn per second when he is outside of the Market. The blue bar on the
22chart shows the range of possible amounts Blue could earn per second when he is outside of
the Market. Notice that they are the same, and range between 40 and 460.
At the beginning of each round, you will receive a randomly drawn number out of this
range. You will be shown this number, so you will know exactly how much you will earn if
you leave the Market.
Your counterpart will also receive a randomly drawn separate number out of this range.
He will see this number and know exactly how much he will earn if he leaves the Market,
but you won't. You will only know the range.
(Note: You will only receive whole numbers from the range of 40 to 460, not fractions.
The random procedure used makes it equally likely that each of these values is chosen).
If you choose to exit the Market, then your gure will physically move into the middle of
the screen, and your outside prots value will also move to the middle of the screen, signaling
that you are now earning the outside prots value. If the other participant exits the Market,
then you will see that participant's gure move to the middle of the screen, and his or her
outside prots value (which you still won't know) will also move to the middle of the screen.
Note that if the other participant exits the Market, you will earn the "If alone" prot of
400 per second. If you exit the Market, then the other participant will earn the "If alone"
prot of 400 per second.
Please recall that if you exit the Market you cannot reenter the Market for the remainder
of the round.
Must someone exit the Market?
Each participant can choose how long he or she stays in the Market { no one will be
forced to exit the Market. Also, no participant will be forced to stay in the Market { it
is possible that both participants choose to exit the Market. There will be 20 rounds of
the experiment. There will be 10 seconds between each round, at which time you will be
randomly paired with a NEW participant and each of you will randomly receive a NEW
Outside Prots Per Second value.
A few reminders before we begin:
231. You will be either a Red or Blue person for the entire experiment.
2. Each round you will be randomly matched with a new participant.
3. Each round you will receive a new outside prots value draw.
4. There is a 1 percent chance each second that the round will end.
5. Once you have decided to exit the Market for a round you will remain out of the
Market for the remainder of the round.
6. One round will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment and your earnings
will be based on your total round prots from the round that is randomly chosen. Recall
that 3000 ECUs = $1.
If there are no more questions we will begin momentarily. Please feel free to ask questions
throughout the duration of the experiment.
Instructions for the FCH sessions
Thank you for participating in today's experiment in economic decision-making. If you
have any questions please do not hesitate to ask myself or one of the other experimenters.
At this time I ask that you refrain from talking to any of the other participants.
This experiment will last for 20 rounds. In this experiment, you will earn ECUs. At
the end of the experiment, you will earn $1 for each 3000 in ECUs you earn. Your Total
Round Earnings, updated each second, are listed on the top of your screen. At the end
of the experiment, one participant will pick a number out of a hat and you will be paid
your earnings for the round that corresponds to the chosen number. These earnings are in
addition to your $5 show-up fee.
In this experiment, you will be either a Red or Blue participant for the entire experiment.
If you are a Red participant it will read, \You are red" under the red gure on your screen,
and if you are a Blue participant it will read, \You are blue" under the blue gure. You will
be randomly matched with another participant in the room for each of the 20 rounds of the
experiment. The current round that the experiment is in is displayed on the bottom of the
screen.
24Each round will last for a number of seconds. At each second, there is a 1 percent chance
that the round will randomly end.
At the beginning of each round, both you and your counterpart are in the Market. The
Market is the yellow area on your screen. As each second passes you will remain in the
Market unless you choose to exit. You can choose to exit the Market by pressing the exit
button next to your gure. When you exit, your gure will literally walk out of the Market.
If you choose to exit the Market you will remain out of the Market for the remainder of
the round.
How do I earn money?
Each participant will begin each round with 25,000 ECU's in Total Round Earnings. During
each second, your Total Round Earnings will either increase or decrease. The change in
your earnings each second will be based on whether you are in the Market and whether your
counterpart is in the Market.
There are two factors that aect how your earnings change when you are in the Market:
Your revenue and your cost.
When both you and your counterpart are in the Market, you each receive a revenue of
100 ECUs per second. However, if one of you chooses to exit the Market, then the one who
is left alone in the Market will receive a revenue of 400 ECUs per second.
You and your counterpart will also each incur a cost of being in the market for each second
you are in the market. On the right-hand side of the screen is a chart labeled \Cost per
second when in the market." The red bar on the chart shows the range of possible costs Red
could have to pay per second when he is in the Market. The blue bar on the chart shows the
range of possible costs Blue could have to pay per second when he is in the Market. Notice
that they are the same, and range between 40 and 460.
At the beginning of each round, you will receive a randomly drawn number out of this
range. You will be shown this number, so you will know exactly what your cost is for each
second you are in the Market. This cost is shown on the left-hand side of your screen. Does
everyone see where their cost is?
25Your counterpart will also receive a randomly drawn separate number out of this range.
He will see this number and know exactly what his cost is for each second he is in the Market,
but you won't. You will only know the range.
(Note: You will only receive whole numbers from the range of 40 to 460, not fractions.
The random procedure used makes it equally likely that each of these values is chosen).
Each second, the change to your Earnings is determined by subtracting your cost from
your revenue. If your cost is higher than your revenue, then you will earn NEGATIVE prots
and lose earnings each second. If your revenue is higher than your cost then you will earn
POSITIVE prots and you will gain earnings each second.
There are two ways to tell whether you are gaining or losing money each second. First,
while you are in the market you will be able to see whether your \Earn Per Second," shown
in the yellow part of the screen, is negative. If it is negative, then you are losing money. If it
is positive then you are earning money. Second, next to your \Total Earnings Per Second"
will be an arrow. If the arrow is pointing down, you are losing money; if the arrow is pointing
up, you are earning money.
Note that it is possible for a participant to begin a round incurring losses (negative
prots), but then switch to earning money (positive prots) if the other participant exits
the market.
If you choose to exit the Market, then your gure will physically move into the middle
of the screen. If the other participant exits the Market, then you will see that participant's
gure move to the middle of the screen.
Note that if the other participant exits the Market, you will receive the \If alone" revenue
of 400 per second. If you exit the Market, then the other participant will receive the \If
alone" revenue of 400 per second. Please recall that if you exit the Market you cannot reenter
the Market for the remainder of the round.
What happens to my revenue per second, cost per second, and total round
prot if I exit the Market?
If you choose to exit the Market then your revenue per second and cost per second both
become zero and your Total Round Earnings stop changing. Whatever your Total Round
26Earnings are when you exit the market will be your nal Total Round Earnings for that
round.
Must someone exit the Market?
Each participant can choose how long he or she stays in the Market., with one exception.
If your Total Round Earnings ever reach zero (i.e. if you ever run out of money), you will
be forced to exit the market. A message reading \You ran out of money" will appear on
your screen, and your gure will exit the market No participant will be forced to stay in the
Market { it is possible that both participants choose to exit the Market.
There will be 20 rounds of the experiment. There will be 5 seconds between each round,
at which time you will be randomly paired with a NEW participant and each of you will
randomly receive a NEW Cost Per Second value.
A few reminders before we begin:
1. You will be either a Red or Blue person for the entire experiment.
2. Each round you will be randomly matched with a new participant.
3. Each round you will receive a new starting amount of 25,000 ECUs.
4. Each round you will receive a new cost per second.
5. There is a 1 percent chance each second that the round will end.
6. If your Total Round Earnings ever run out (reach zero), then you will be forced
out of the market.
7. Once you have decided to exit the Market for a round you will remain out of the
Market for the remainder of the round.
8. One round will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment and your earnings
will be based on your total round prots from the round that is randomly chosen. Recall
that 3000 ECUs = $1.
If there are no more questions we will begin momentarily. Please feel free to ask questions
throughout the duration of the experiment.
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